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Abstract
This paper extends the work of Pauly (1973) by analysing the optimal
organization of an economy in which individuals experience spatially-
limited altruism. With such altruism, the nonpoor members of society care
more about the poor living near them than about those living farther away.
The main theme of the paper is that while the proximity of the poor gives
mixed communities an altruistic advantage over homogeneous communities, the
intermixing of rich and poor generates an efficiency loss in that public
consumption in mixed communities cannot be tailored to suit individual
preferences. As a result, a mixed community configuration (where income
redistribution proceeds through local transfers) may or may not be superior
to a homogeneous configuration (in which redistribution is conducted by the
federal government). In addition to analysing this altruism/efficiency
loss trade-off, the paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes when
communities are organized by competitive developers.
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1._. Intrpductioii
In an important paper, Pauly (1973) introduced the notion of
spatially-limited altruism into the income redistribution literature. With
this type of altruism, the nonpoor members of society care more about the
poor living near them than about those living far away. Using this
assumption, Pauly argued that income redistribution should be locally
controlled and tailored to suit the features of each community. He argued
that national redistribution, which imposes a nationally uniform policy,
generates an efficiency loss by preventing such local discretion.
The purpose of the present paper is to give a more complete treatment
of Pauly' s idea by analysing the optimal organization of an economy in
which people experience spatially-limited altruism. In contrast to Pauly's
normative analysis, which assumed a fixed spatial distribution of the
population, the present paper attempts to determine the spatial grouping of
rich and poor that is best for society. Although a direct application of
Pauly's model would suggest that the rich and poor should live together so
that the rich can reap the greatest benefit from their generosity, the
issue is more complex in the present framework. This is a consequence of
the additional assumption that individuals in the economy consume public
goods. Since public consumption in mixed communities cannot be tailored to
suit individual preferences, enjoyment of the altruistic benefits of such
communities entails an efficiency loss on the consumption side. This loss
2is avoided in homogeneous communities but enjoyment of altruism is
sacrificed. Much of the analysis in the paper is devoted to analysing
this altruism/efficiency loss trade-off and to identifying the different
conditions under which mixed and homogeneous communities are desirable.
The paper also analyses equilibrium community configurations under the
assumption that communities are organized by competitive, profit-maximizing
developers. 1 It is shown (subject to certain qualifications) that mixed
communities emerge in equilibrium whenever such a configuration is
desirable from an efficiency standpoint.
The lessons of the analysis regarding which level of government
should carry out income redistribution are somewhat different than in
Pauly's paper. It is clear that if the optimal organization of the economy
entails mixed communities, then there is no need for a national
redistribution program since local transfers can achieve identical results.
While local redistribution can thus be optimal in that it may be no worse
than a national policy, a national system is clearly required if the
economy is to be organized into homogeneous communities. For this reason,
reliance on local redistribution can be inefficient even in the presence of
spatially-limited altruism, in contrast to Pauly's conclusion.
The paper's analytical framework is based on the standard economic
model of clubs, as developed by Buchanan (1965), Berglas (1976b), and
Berglas and Pines (1981 ). a Although the connection to Pauly makes the
local redistribution question an important focus of the analysis, the
paper's main contribution is to extend the theory of clubs by stating new
conditions under which mixed clubs might be optimal. There has been
considerable interest in this issue in the literature. Berglas (1976a),
for example, showed that mixing is desirable when different types of people
3are complementary in production. More recently, Berglas (1984) proved the
much less obvious result that mixing may be optimal in the presence of
multiple public goods. In analysing spatially-limited altruism, this paper
identifies a new force favoring the formation of mixed clubs.
2 . Normative Analysis
The model has two types of individuals, a and b, with the a's feeling
altruism for the b's, as specified further below. The b's comprise a
fraction 6 of the economy's total population N, with the a's accounting for
1-9 of the total. Exogenous incomes for the two groups are I a and I b .
Given the a's altruism, it is natural to suppose that the b's are
relatively poor (I to < I"*) , although this assumption plays no role in the
analysis. Consumption goods in the economy include a private good x and a
congested public good z. The cost in terms of x of providing public
consumption z to a community (hereafter "club") of n people is C(z,n). C
is increasing and convex in z, and congestion implies that the partial
derivative C n is positive. A further assumption is that for any z > 0, per
capita cost C(z,n)/n is a U-shaped function of n, which guarantees the
existence of a positive finite optimal club size.
The (well-behaved) type-a and type-b utility functions are U(x,z,k)
and V(x,z), where the k argument captures the altruism felt by the a's. A
fundamental assumption is that this altruism is spatially limited, which
means that an a-type cares more about the b's living in his own club than
those living in other clubs. Moreover, the possibility of joint
consumption of public goods means that k does not depend simply on the
post-transfer income of the b's (as in the usual formulation of altruism)
but instead reflects their achieved utility level. There are various ways
of modeling the spatially-limited utility interdependence implied by these
4assumptions. One possibility would be to assume that k equals a
population-weighted average of the utility levels of type-b consumers, with
a higher weight applied to b's in the home club of a representative a- type.
In other words, for an a-type living in a club containing n b b-types, k
would equal [(a + p)n lJvhom '' + p(9N - n b ) v"w~ y ] /8N , where vhom" is the type-
fa utility in the home club, v aweiy is the (average) type-b utility in other
clubs, [5 > is a parameter measuring "generalized" altruism (which is felt
regardless of the location of the b's), and a > is parameter measuring
"local" altruism (which is felt only toward b's in the same club). Recall
from above that 9N equals the number of b-types in the economy. While this
is in some ways a natural formulation, it has the peculiar implication that
for a given uniform b-type utility (
v
home,
=V*way = constant ) , k is increasing
in n b , implying that an a-type is happier in a club with a larger type-b
population. This seems inconsistent with typical behavior, under which the
nonpoor care about the welfare of the poor but do not wish to live
surrounded by them. A modification that addresses this objection would be
to write the vHom" term above as [ag(n b ) + (3n b ]vhomeV0N, where g is a
function satisfying g(n b ) > 0, g(0) = 0, and g'(0) > 0. This formulation
allows k to rise initially with the type-b population when vhom *'=v'*way , but
the possibility that g' could turn negative means that further increases in
n
b may ultimately depress k in a realistic fashion.
Since the appearance of the absolute population size n b in the
modified k formula is inconvenient in the later analysis, the formula is
further altered to read k = [(af(o) + p)vhom,s + (3v*w" y ], where o is the
proportion of b-types in the club population and f is a function satisfying
f(o) > 0. f(0) = 0. and f'(0) > 0. This formulation eliminates the
population weights on generalized altruism, so that for given home and away
5utilities, generalized altruism is independent of the distribution of the
type-b population. This is plausible given that altruism may reflect an
implicit division of the poor population into local and nonlocal components
that ignores the relative sizes of these groups. An additional change is
that local altruism now depends on the proportion of b's in the local
population rather than their absolute number (the factor 1/9N is also
suppressed). In the spirit of the earlier formulation, k initially rises
with o but further increases in the type-b proportion may be make the a's
worse off. While this formulation is somewhat arbitrary, it captures the
essential aspect of spatially-limited altruism and it proves to be
convenient in the analysis.
The normative problem is to characterize Pareto-ef f icient club
configurations in the model. For purposes of clarity, it is desirable to
focus first on two simple configurations: one consisting of homogeneous
type-a and type-b clubs and another consisting of identical mixed clubs.
The first part of this section analyses these two configurations and proves
a number of results regarding their relative merits. Once this analysis is
complete, the discussion considers more complex configurations containing
both mixed and homogeneous clubs. The ultimate goal is to state conditions
which allow the optimal club configuration among all those considered to be
identified.
Efficient configurations are analysed under the standard requirement
of horizontal equity (identical utilities for identical people). Moreover,
all clubs of a given type (mixed, homogeneous type-a, homogeneous type-b)
are constrained to be identical (configurations violating this requirement
are inefficient). 3 To analyse a homogeneous club configuration (denoted H
hereafter), the first step is to note that since type-b utilities are
6uniform under the horizontal equity requirement, the altruism expression k
is evaluated with vhom"'=v~w,*y =v. Furthermore, since clubs are homogeneous,
the type-b proportion o equals zero in each club where the a-types live.
Recalling that f(0) = 0. these facts mean that the altruism argument under
H satisfies k = 2(Jv = 6v, where v is the uniform type-b utility and 6 = 2(3
.
A Pareto-ef f icient H configuration then solves the following problem:
max U(x a ,
z
M
,6v)
s.t. V(x b .zb ) = v (1
)
(l-e)Nxa + 9Nxb + [(l-9)N/nm ]C(za ,n-)
+ (6N/n b )C(z b ,n b ) = (1-8)NI- + 6NI b . (2)
Eq. (2) above is the resource constraint for an economy with homogeneous
clubs. The RHS is total income in the economy, and the first two terms on
the LHS give total consumption of the private good x. The remaining terms
give the cost of public good provision in all the economy's clubs. Note
that the number of clubs of each type equals group population [(1-9)N for
the a's, 0N for the b's] divided by the relevant club population (n™ or
nb ). As is standard in club theory, we ignore the fact that these
expressions need not be integer-valued (the problem is inconsequential if N
is large relative to optimal club sizes). The necessary conditions for an
optimum in the above problem are the two constraints together with
n~U,/Ux = C,- (3)
n
bV x /V„ = C x b (4)
C„* = CVn 1 , i=a,b, (5)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and where the i superscripts on
C and Cn indicate that the functions are evaluated at (zSn 1 ), i=a.b. Eqs
.
7(3) and (4) are the Samuelson conditions for the two types of clubs, and
(5) indicates that club populations are chosen to minimize the per capita
cost of (optimal) public consumption. 4
Consider now a configuration of identical mixed clubs, each of which
mirrors the overall composition of the population (having a type-b
proportion equal to 0). Let this configuration be denoted by CM, for
"completely mixed." A key feature of the CM configuration is that, because
of the proximity of the b's, the altruistic benefits enjoyed by the a's are
greater than in the homogeneous clubs formed under H. This can be seen by
computing the value of k in mixed clubs. Since vHomo =vaway =v and f is now
evaluated at 9 rather than zero, k = [af(8) + [5]v + (iv = [af(8) + 6]v.
which exceeds the previous value of 6v. A disadvantage of CM, however, is
that in contrast to the H configuration, the public good level in its mixed
clubs cannot be tailored to suit individual preferences. Substituting the
new value of k, a Pareto-ef f icient CM configuration solves the following
problem:
max UU-.z, [af (9) + 6]v)
s.t. V(xb ,z) = v (6)
(l-9)nx» + 9nx b + C(z,n) = (l-9)nl~ + 9nl b . (7)
Eq. (7) is the resource constraint for a representative club, with n giving
the club's population and z the common public good level consumed by its
residents. The necessary conditions for an (interior) optimum are the two
constraints along with
(l-9)nlWUx + enV./V,, = C x (8)
C„ = C/n. (9)
8Eq. (8) is the Samuelson condition for the mixed club, which reflects the
compromise of tastes imposed by heterogeneity, and (9) is the per capita
cost-minimization condition. The number of clubs N/n need not be integer-
valued, but this problem is again ignored. e
It should be noted that although the formulation of the H and CM
problems uses a common parametric v, achievement of a given type-b utility
is not always feasible in both problems^ It is easy to see, for example,
that the lowest possible v value under H (which equals V(0,0), reflecting
complete expropriation of the b's) is lower than the lowest v under CM,
which is based on a positive value of z. Similarly, it may be shown that
the highest feasible value of v is higher under H than under CM."7 As a
result, the feasible set of v's under CM is a subset of feasible set under
H.
The key to comparing H and CM configurations for a common value of v
is to note that the CM constraint (7) is equivalent to the H constraint (2)
together with the side conditions
z" = z b
,
n" = n b . (10)
These "mixing constraints," which are necessary for common type-a and type-
b consumption of public goods, reduce the size of the CM opportunity set
relative to that of the H problem. Ordinarily, this would lead to a lower
value of the objective function (type-a utility) under CM. However, since
the altruistic advantage of mixed clubs means that, for given values of the
choice variables, the CM objective function achieves a higher value than
the H function, the effect of the smaller CM opportunity set may be
reversed. Together, these considerations imply that the preferred
configuration in a choice between H and CM cannot be determined in general.
9Intuitively, this indeterminacy arises because there is a trade-off between
the altruistic advantage of mixed clubs and the efficiency loss resulting
from common consumption of public goods by people of different types. This
trade-off will be analysed in detail below.
A critical difference between the H and the CM configurations is that
the minimal institutional structure required to carry out income
redistribution is different under the two regimes. Since income is
redistributed via transfers between type-a and type-b clubs under H, this
configuration cannot be implemented in the absence of a national
redistribution system run by the federal government. While the federal
government could also handle income redistribution in the CM configuration,
the intermixture of the a's and b's means that local governments can
achieve identical results. Since the CM configuration is potentially
efficient, it follows that local redistribution may be compatible with
efficiency in some circumstances. However, since an economy that relies on
local redistribution cannot attain the H configuration, local
redistribution may be inconsistent with the achievement of efficiency in
other situations.
The choice between H and CM can be resolved in favor of CM provided
that the the altruistic gain from mixed clubs dominates the associated
efficiency loss. This outcome will obtain when the altruistic advantage
from mixing is "large" or the efficiency loss from mixing is "small."
Focusing on the second of these conditions, the above discussion suggests
that the efficiency loss will be zero when the mixing constraints (10) hold
at the H solution and small when these constraints are approximately
satisfied. In other words, if the optimal homogeneous clubs of the groups
are identical or nearly so, then the loss from the taste compromise in
10
mixed clubs will not be significant. This notion is made precise as
follows
:
Proposition 1. Suppose that for some v = v', the mixing constraints
(10) hold at the solution to the H problem, and suppose that v' is
feasible in the CM problem. Then CM is preferred to H for all v in a
neighborhood of v' when a > 0.
This result can be established by first proving that when a = (when local
altruism is absent), the CM and H solutions are identical whenever (10)
holds at the H solution. This can be seen by multiplying (3) and (4) by
(1-0) and 8 respectively and adding, which yields the Samuelson condition
(8) for a mixed club with an a value of zero (note that the RHS ' s of (3)
and (4) are identical by (10)). Since (5) and (9) are the same and (2)
reduces to (7), it follows that the H solution satisfies the CM optimality
conditions when a = 0, implying that the two solutions are the same. Since
the H and CM objective functions are also identical when a = 0, the values
of these functions are then equal at the respective solutions (in other
words, UCM = UH ) . But since UCM is increasing in a by the envelope theorem
(the derivative is f(8)vU ktCM > 0), it follows that UCM exceeds U H for a >
when v = v'. By continuity, it then follows that CM is superior to H for
all v lying in some neighborhood of v'. a
While it is possible to construct pathological examples where (10)
holds at the H solution, this outcome arises naturally when preferences for
x and z are the same. Suppose, for example, that U(x,z,k) s V(x,z) W(k),
so that k enters the type-a utility function in an additively separable
manner and the (x.z) portion of the function is identical to the type-b
utility function. Then it is easy to see that CM is superior for all
values of v in a neighborhood of v" , where v" is the type-b utility
achieved in a homogeneous club with post-transfer income of Y~ = (1-8)1" +
11
ei b . The reason is that if the a's and b's enjoy identical post-transfer
incomes under H (Ya = Yb ), then (10) holds and CM is preferred. But since
equality of the Y's means that they both must equal the average pre-
transfer income in the economy [(1-6)1™ + 9I b ] , it follows from Proposition
1 that when a > 0, CM is preferred to H in a neighborhood of the v value
associated with this Y b . Suppose further that U satisfies the above
assumptions and in addition V(x,z) s x + S(z), where S' > and S" < 0.
Then CM is superior to H for any common value of v when a > 0. This
follows because when utility has the given transferable form, homogeneous
clubs are identical regardless of the value of v (conditions (3)-(5) do not
involve x, so that they yield the same common (z,n) solution for all values
of v). Intuitively, the absence of income effects with transferable
utility makes the earlier result hold regardless of the distribution of
income
.
In addition to the above results, it is intuitively clear that the
efficiency loss from mixed clubs will be small when preferences are
"similar" since this reduces the required compromise of tastes from joint
consumption of public goods. In the first case above, for example, suppose
that the (x,z) component of U is a function that is "similar" to V rather
than identically equal to it. Then the efficiency loss from mixing will be
low for v values near v" , and CM will be superior in this range. This
argument can be made precise in the transferable utility case, as follows:
Proposition 2. Suppose that U(x.z.k) = x + fiS(z) + W(k) and V(x,z) h
x + S(z). with S' > and S" < and Q > 0. Then when a > 0, there
exist positive numbers Ui(v) and u 2 (v) such that CM is preferred to H
at a given v when satisfies 1 - Ui(v) < < 1 + u 2 (v) and H is
preferred to CM when fl > 1 + u 2 (v) or Q < 1 - u a (v).
12
This result says that when the groups' tastes are sufficiently similar. CM
is preferred to H. To prove the proposition, first note that the
derivative of UCM - U H with respect to Q equals S(zOM ) - S(z~") (the z's in
this expression are optimal values under the two configurations). This
expression can be signed by comparing the Samuelson conditions (4) and (8),
which reduce to n^OS
'
a
= C x " and (l-9)nfiS' + 9nS ' = C x respectively under
the present assumptions. The key is to note that the first condition comes
from setting 9 equal to zero in the second condition. The optimal z values
can be therefore be compared by computing the derivative of z in a mixed
club with respect to 9. Totally differentiating the mixed-club Samuelson
condition along with the cost-minimization condition (9) and using the
second-order conditions for the CM problem, it is easy to show that z is an
decreasing (increasing) function of 9 when Q is greater than (less than)
unity. 9 It follows therefore that the z value corresponding to 9 = (z aH )
is greater than (less than) the mixed-club value (z CM ) as fl is greater than
(less than) unity. Referring to the above derivative expression, it is
then clear that UCM - UH is decreasing (increasing) in Q when ft is greater
than (less than) unity. Recalling from the discussion following
Proposition 1 that UCM - UH > when Q = 1, the existence of the Ui(v) and
u a (v) values in Proposition 2 then follows by continuity. 10
With the superiority of CM demonstrated under a "small" efficiency
loss from mixing, consider now the first of the earlier conditions: a
"large" altruistic gain from CM. The altruistic advantage of CM depends on
the magnitude of the parameter a, with larger values indicating a larger
gain. Clearly, if a is large enough, this gain will be sufficient to
offset any efficiency loss, making CM preferred to H. This notion is made
precise as follows:
13
Proposition 3. For any common v in the H and CM problems, there
exists a critical value of a, denoted a*(v) > 0, such that CM is
preferred to H for all a satisfying a > a*(v) and H is preferred to
CM for all a satisfying a*(v) > a > 0. If the mixing constraints
(10) are satisfied at the H solution, then a*(v) = 0. Otherwise,
a*(v) > 0.
This result is established by first recalling from the proof of Proposition
1 that if (10) holds at the H solution, then UCM - UH is zero for a = and
positive for a > 0. This shows that a*(v) = for any v where the mixing
constraints hold. If, on the other hand, (10) is not satisfied at the H
solution for a given v, then the smaller size of the CM opportunity set
matters and UCM - UH < holds when a = (recall that the objective
functions are the same when a = 0). But since the utility difference is
increasing in a, there exists some positive a*(v) where the difference
changes sign from negative to positive.
The choice between CM and H that has been the subject of the
preceding analysis can be illustrated diagrammatically by drawing the
utility frontiers for the economy under the two policies. These curves
show the maximal value of U as a function of v under CM and H (they are
graphs of UCM and UH ). Examples of such curves are illustrated in Figure 1
(u denotes the type-a utility level). 11 The policy whose curve is higher
at given v is, of course, preferred. Referring back to the respective
optimization problems, the slopes of the H and CM frontiers equal 6UkH -
9U 3CH/(1-0)VXM and [af(8) + 6]U*CM - 6UxCM/( 1-9)VXCM respectively. While
these expressions are negative when U* is zero, the slopes can be positive
in the presence of altruism, implying that redistribution can raise both
utility levels simultaneously over some range of v. This is seen in Figure
1, where the CM frontier has an upward sloping range (for later
convenience, the H frontier is shown as downward sloping).
14
The H and CM club configurations discussed so far are in fact special
cases in a more general choice problem. The analysis now focuses on this
general problem with the goal of identifying the optimal club structure
from among all those that are feasible. As will become clear, the previous
results comparing H and CM are useful in this more comprehensive analysis.
In the most complex possible club configuration, mixed clubs coexist with
homogeneous clubs of each type. Clubs of a given type as before are
identical, and horizontal equity requires that members of each group enjoy
the same utility level regardless of whether they live in a mixed or
homogeneous club. Letting Q denote the number of mixed clubs, o denote the
type-b proportion in their populations, x"H and xbh denote x consumption in
homogeneous clubs, and I = (1-9)1" + 9I b
,
the general Pareto-optimality
i
problem can be written
max U(x", z
,
[af (o) + 6]v)
s.t. V(x b ,z) = v
U(x-,z, [af (o) + 6]v) = U(x- h ,z-,6v) (11)
V(xb ,z) = V(xbh ,z b ) (12)
Q[(l-o)nx" + onxb + C(z,n)]
+ [(1-0)N - Q(l-o)n][n-x"H + C(z" , n») J/n tt
+ [9N - Qon][nbxbb + C(z b ,n b )]/n b = NI
.
(13)
Note that (11) and (12) are the horizontal equity constraints and that
[(1-9)N - Q(l-o)n]/n™ and [9N - Qon]/nb are the numbers of homogenous type-
a and type-b clubs (total group size minus the population in mixed clubs
divided by n 1
,
i=a,b). 12 Implicit constraints in the problem are < o < 1
and < Q < min{ (l-9)N/( l-o)n, 9N/on}, with the last inequality saying that
mixed clubs cannot contain more than the total population of either group.
15
As before, the first-order conditions for choice of the x, z, and n
variables reduce to the mixed- and homogeneous-club Samuelson and per
capita cost-minimization conditions. The interesting questions in the
general problem, however, concern the variables Q and o. The following
result is immediate:
Proposition 4. In an optimal configuration, mixed clubs can coexist
with at most one type of homogeneous club (either a or b).
This result follows directly from the fact that the Lagrangean expression L
for the problem is linear in Q. This means that a corner solution is
optimal, with Q either equal to zero or min{ ( 1-6 )N/ ( l-o)n, 0N/on}. Since
at least one of the equalities (l-o)nS = (1-9)N, onS = 0N must therefore
hold when Q is positive, it follows that the entire population of one. or
both groups fits into mixed clubs, as claimed. When o = 0, both equalities
hold together and everyone lives in mixed clubs (this is the CM
configuration)
.
A club structure containing both mixed and homogeneous type-a or
type-b clubs will be referred to as a PM configuration (for "partially
mixed"). A key question is whether some PM configuration is superior to
the CM configuration analysed above. To answer this question, consider the
gains and losses from allowing o to deviate from 0. First, some change in
o will typically make each mixed club's population makeup more advantageous
from an altruistic point of view. Recalling that local altruism depends on
the type-b proportion through the function f, the a's will gain from
increasing (decreasing) the type-b proportion relative to as f
'
( 8 ) is
positive (negative). This altruistic gain has a cost, however, in that the
individuals displaced from the mixed club must be guaranteed the same
utility as those that remain. If the amount of extra resources required to
16
achieve this equality is less than the (appropriately measured) altruistic
gain, then some deviation of o away from 8 is desirable. The following
result formalizes these considerations:
Proposition 5. CM cannot be optimal if one or both of the following
inequalities holds at the CM solution:
aUK f ' (8)v/Ux > [(x~ h t C*/n") - (x~ + C/n)]/9(l-0) (14)
-aU,«f ' (8)v/U x > [(x bh + C b /n b ) - (x b + C/n)]/(l-6) 2 (15)
This result 13 is established by substituting Q = min{ ( 1-0 )N/( l-o)n , 6N/on}
into the Lagrangean L and differentiating with respect to o in the separate
cases where o > 8 and o < 8. It is easily seen that L
| ose is positive at
o=8 when (14) holds and that L CT | ose is negative at o = 8 when (15) holds.
In either case, there exist PM configurations close to CM that yield higher
values of the objective function than CM itself, establishing the
Proposition. To relate the above inequalities to the previous intuitive
discussion, note that the altruistic gain (loss) in terms of x from
increasing o above 8 is captured by the first term in (14) while the loss
(gain) from decreasing o below 8 is measured by the first term in (15).
The resource costs discussed above appear on the RHS of these inequalities.
The cost of displacing an a-type into a homogeneous club (the cost of a
higher o) equals the difference between per capita consumption of the a's
in homogenous and mixed clubs, while the cost of displacing a b-type (of
reducing o) is the analogous difference in per capita type-b consumption.
The factors 1/8(1-8) and l/(l-8) 2 are needed to apportion these costs among
the a-types remaining in the mixed club. 1 * It is easy to see that the
type-b displacement cost is negative while the type-a cost is ambiguous in
sign. The first claim (xbH + C b /nb < x b + C/n) follows because public
consumption inefficiency in a mixed club means that the b's must consume
17
more resources than in a homogenous club to achieve a given utility level.
While this effect is also present for the a's, the countervailing
altruistic advantage of mixed clubs means that resource requirements could
be greater or smaller in a mixed club. The upshot is that the RHS of (14)
is ambiguous in sign while the RHS of (15) is negative.
To check for satisfaction of (14) or (15), consider first the case
where a > and f'(0) > 0. Since the LHS ' s of the inequalities are
respectively positive and negative in this case while the RHS ' s are
ambiguous and negative, neither (14) nor (15) is guaranteed to hold. It is
important to realize that if neither inequality is satisfied, then CM is
possibly though not necessarily preferred to PM. Although CM is sure to be
preferred if the maximized objective function for the problem is concave in
o on either side of 0, nonconcavity means that PM could be preferred even
though small movements away from CM are undesirable. If (14) or (15)
happens to hold, on the other hand, then there exist PM configurations that
dominate CM. Note that (14) and (15) may hold simultaneously.
A stronger statement can be made when f'(0) - 0. as follows:
Proposition 6. Suppose that a > and that f'(o) ^ holds for o >
0. Then, if the optimal configuration contains mixed clubs, it must
be a PM configuration with o < 0.
To prove this result, note first that (15) is guaranteed to hold when f'(0)
< 0, so that there exist PM configurations with o < that are superior to
CM. To show further that no PM configuration with o > can be optimal
under the given assumptions, suppose to the. contrary that such a
configuration is in fact optimal. Then note that for mixed clubs to exist
at the optimum, the derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to Q must be
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positive at the given o (otherwise the positive corner solution cannot be
optimal). This derivative has the same sign as
(lo)[(xah + C»/n») - (x- + C/n)J
+ o[(xbh + C b /n b ) - (x b + C/n)]. (16)
Intuitively. (16) must be positive for mixed clubs to be optimal because
moving people into homogeneous clubs must then increase per capita
consumption. 10 Since x toH + C b /n b < x b + C/n holds from above, resources
can always be saved by relocating b-types in this manner. Therefore, if
mixed clubs are to be optimal, relocating the a's must consume extra
resources, making the first term in (16) positive. The final step is use
this fact to show that the o-derivative of the Lagrangean at the supposedly
optimal o > 9 is negative, which is a contradiction. This derivative is
negative whenever the LHS of (14) (with o replacing 8 throughout) is less
than the RHS . Since the LHS and RHS are respectively nonpositive and
positive given the previous result and f < 0, the contradiction follows,
implying that an optimal configuration with o > 9 is impossible under the
given assumptions.
The ultimate goal of the analysis is to identify the club
configuration that is optimal under given circumstances. While none of the
propositions by itself yields this information, the results can be merged
to help identify the optimum. Generally, whenever circumstances are such
that CM is preferred to H at a given v, then the optimal configuration
contains mixed clubs. These clubs coexist with homogeneous clubs if there
are PM configurations preferred to CM at the given v. Otherwise, the
optimal configuration contains only mixed clubs. Suppose, for example,
that utility is transferable and that preferences are "similar" in the
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sense of Proposition 2, and suppose further that f'(o) < for o > 0. Then
it follows from Propositions 2 and 6 that a PM configuration with a < 9 is
optimal at the given v. if, however, f'(6) > holds under these
circumstances, then CM could replace PM as the mixed-club optimum.
Similarly, when the mixing constraints hold at a given v or when a exceeds
the critical value a*(v), then by Propositions 1 and 3, the optimal
configuration contains mixed clubs, with either CM or PM optimal.
When H is preferred to CM, on the other hand, the identity of the
optimal configuration is not clear. While H is optimal in this case if CM
dominates PM, H could be better or worse than PM otherwise. Since
Proposition 5 does not offer a sufficient condition for CM to be preferred
to PM, the Propositions as a whole do not yield a sufficient conditions for
the optimality of H. By focusing on the general choice' problem, however,
it is easy to establish the obvious result that H must be optimal in the
absence of local altruism (a = 0). This is done by referring to the LQ
expression (16). If (16) is zero or positive for some o between zero and
one when Q = 0, aa then per capita consumption of resources can be reduced
by moving people out of homogeneous clubs into a mixed club with the given
o. Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of H
is that (16) be negative for all o between zero and one. Recalling the
above discussion, it is clear that negativity will hold when a = 0. Since
there is then no gain to the a-types to offset the public consumption
inefficiency of mixed clubs, more resources must be consumed than in a
homogeneous club to reach a given utility level. With the same conclusion
holding for the b-types, the negativity of (16) (and the optimality of H)
follows. It may also be shown that H is optimal in the transferable
utility case whenever the type-a preference parameter Q from Proposition 2
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is sufficiently large (indicating a substantial difference in
preferences ) . 1T
The preceding analysis of the general choice problem can be
incorporated into Figure 1 by replacing the H and CM frontiers with a
general utility frontier showing for each v the value of u at the problem's
solution. If H or CM is optimal at a given v, then the general frontier-
coincides with either the H or CM frontier at that point. Otherwise, the
general frontier is higher than either of the other frontiers.
While it was seen above that local governments can handle income
redistribution under the CM configuration, a national redistribution
program must exist to carry out the interclub transfers that will typically
be required in a PM configuration. Since local governments, however, can
handle part of the redistributive duties under PM, such a configuration can
be supported by a dual system involving both local and national transfers.
3. Positivei Analysis
The key feature of standard models of altruism is that through the
voluntary action of individuals in the economy, the utility of the poor
group is raised above the level corresponding to the original distribution
of income. The purpose of the positive analysis in this section of the
paper is to see whether this outcome obtains in the present model. The
goal is to determine the level of v that actually emerges as a result of
decentralized behavior (v, of course, was parametric in the planning
problem). The analysis is carried out under the assumption that clubs are
organized by competitive developers, as in Berglas and Pines (1980. 1981).
A key feature of the competitive model is that developers, being small
operators, are not able to make interclub transfers. This means that PM
configurations and all H configurations except one are not attainable in
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the model. The only feasible configurations are the CM configuration and
the H configuration based on the original distribution of income, neither
of which involves interclub transfers. The unattainability of some club
configurations means that equilibrium in the model may not be efficient.
To reduce the likelihood of this outcome, one possible source of
inefficiency is removed by the assumption that generalized altruism is
absent (6 = 0), which means that the H frontier in Figure 1 is always
downward sloping. This rules out a situation in which the one attainable H
configuration, denoted NR for "no redistribution", is automatically Pareto-
inefficient as a result of being dominated by one of the unattainable
configurations on the H frontier.
A critical additional assumption is that in forming mixed clubs,
developers are required (by law, perhaps) to mix the a's and the b's in
accordance with the overall composition of the population, forming clubs
with type-b proportions o equal to 8. This requirement will be referred to
as the "club composition constraint." As will be seen below, equilibrium
may not exist when developers are allowed to choose o.
The analysis first derives the features of the homogenous and mixed
clubs organized by developers. The discussion then identifies the club
structure (homogeneous or mixed) that actually emerges in equilibrium.
Consider the problem faced by a developer organizing a homogeneous type-a
club. ls His choice variables are the public good level in the club and the
size of its population. Being competitive, the developer is a "utility-
taker," which means that the club entry fee P" that he charges must allow
the a's to achieve at least the prevailing utility u for their type.
Recalling that 6=0 and that homogeneous clubs must reflect the original
distribution of income, P~ therefore satisfies U( I"-P",z",0) > u. In
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equilibrium, this relationship will hold as an equality, implicitly
determining the entry fee as a function of z" and u. Differentiation shows
that Pa is an increasing function of the the public good level (Px" =
U»/U x ) and a decreasing function of u. The developer's problem is then to
maximize the following profit expression by choice of z" and n":
K m _ n-p-( z - >u ) - C(z a ,n"). (17)
The first-order conditions are the Samuelson condition (3) and P" - Cn° =
0. In a zero-profit equilibrium, the latter condition reduces to the per
capita cost-minimization condition (5) and (substituting the budget
constraint) rc a = reduces to the resource constraint of the club (note
that u becomes endogenous when the zero-profit condition is added). The
equilibrium and planning conditions are therefore identical, implying that
developer-organized clubs are efficient. Since exactly the same argument
applies to the creation of type-b clubs, it follows that the utilities in
competitively-organized homogeneous clubs lie on the H frontier of Figure 1
at point NR.
Now consider the problem of the mixed-club developer, who provides a
common level of the public good to both the a's and the b's. While the a's
may voluntarily enter a mixed club to benefit from the presence of the b's,
the b's themselves have no such incentive and will require compensation in
the form of a transfer payment to join a mixed club. The transfer T is
provided by the developer, who collects the necessary funds from the a's.
While the two groups pay a common club entry fee P, the presence of the
transfer makes their net costs of joining the club different.
For a mixed club to attract residents, the formal requirement is that
P and T assume values that allow each individual to achieve at least the
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prevailing utility level for his type. P and T are then jointly determined
by the following conditions:
U(I»-P-0T/(l-0),z,af(0)v) =u (18)
V(I b-P+T,z) = v. (19)
(note in (18) that the per capita tax on the a's depends on the type-b
proportion, -which is set at to satisfy the club composition
constraint)
.
as Total differentiation of (18) and (19) shows that P z = (1-
QJU^/U^ + ev^/V^ and that P is decreasing in u. zo As before, the developer
chooses z and n to maximize
it = nP(z.u.v) - C(z,n)
, (20)
with first-order conditions being the Samuelson condition (8) and P -• C„ =
0. As before, the latter condition reduces to the per capita cost-
minimization condition (9) in a zero-profit equilibrium. Also, after
multiplying the type-a and type-b budget constraints by (1-0) and
respectively, adding, and substituting the implied P into (20), the zero-
profit condition gives back the mixed-club resource constraint. As a
result, the equilibrium and planning conditions are once again equivalent,
implying that competitively-organized mixed clubs are efficient.
While utility levels for both the a's and the b's were determined
endogenously in the creation of homogeneous clubs, there are only three
conditions to determine four unknowns (z.n.u.v) in the mixed-club case. As
a result, one of the parametric utilities (say v) remains undetermined in
this case. The efficiency result therefore means that clubs are efficient
conditional on v, implying that the economy reaches some point on the CM
frontier as a result of the activities of developers.
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Having looked separately at homogeneous and mixed clubs, it is now
possible to analyse the club structure that emerges in equilibrium. For a
club configuration to be an equilbrium, it must accomodate the economy's
population and there must exist no alternative clubs that are both
profitable (yielding positive profit for the developer) and viable
(offering potential residents higher utility than they enjoy in the given
configuration). With this in mind, the following result can be
established:
Proposition 7. Assume that generalized altruism is absent and that
clubs are organized by competitive developers who are subject to the
club composition constraint, as described above. If there are no
points on the CM frontier satisfying u > uNR and v > vNR . where uNR
and vNR are the utility levels at point NR on the H frontier, then
the equilibrium club configuration is the homogeneous configuration
corresponding to NR . If the CM frontier contains points satisfying u
> uNR and v > vNR , then multiple equilibria are possible. Each
equilibrium configuration is mixed, with any point on the CM frontier
satisfying u > uNR and v > vNR and not Pareto-dominated by some other
point corresponding to a possible equilibrium.
To prove the first statement in the proposition, the first step is to
recall that in the homogeneous case, club entry fees (and hence the profit
levels of developers) are decreasing functions of the group utility levels.
Next, note that under the assumption that no points on the CM frontier
satisfy u > uNR and v > vNR , a developer-organized mixed club must yield a
utility level lower than the NR level for at least one group. Suppose
without loss of generality that such a club has u = u' < uNR . This club
cannot be part of an equilibrium configuration because a homogeneous type-a
club offering a utility u" between u' and uNR would attract away the a's
and earn its developer a positive profit (this follows because K^ n < and
rc~ = when u = uNR ). With a mixed-club equilibrium ruled out by this
argument, consider the homogeneous configuration corresponding to NR
.
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First, since any viable alternative homogeneous club must offer a utility
higher than the NR level to one group, it. will lose money. Similarly,
since a viable mixed club must also improve on the NR utilities, it must
lie above the CM frontier. But since mixed-club profit is zero on the
frontier and rcu < 0, such a club also loses money. This establishes that
the homogeneous NR configuration is the equilibrium under the given
assumptions
.
21
Now suppose that the CM frontier passes to the northeast of NR, so
that some of its points satisfy u > uNR and v > vNR . In this case, the
argument used above to rule out mixed-clubs shows that all CM points with
at least one utility less than the NR level are not equilibria (viable and
profitable homogeneous clubs exist). Furthermore, the homogeneous NR
configuration cannot be an equilibrium in this case since a mixed club
offering a utility pair below the CM frontier but still to the northeast of
NR will offer higher utilities than NR and be profitable. This leaves
points on the CM frontier to satisfying u > uNR and v > vNN as candidates
for equilibria. Suppose one of these points with coordinates (u'.v 1 ) is
Pareto-dominated by another such point with coordinates (u",v"), a
possiblity given that the CM frontier may contain upward-sloping segments.
In this case, (u'.v 1 ) cannot be an equilibrium because a mixed club
offering a utility pair slightly below (u",v") would be viable and
profitable. The remaining undominated points, however, satisfy the
requirements of equilibrium. First, since any profitable homogeneous club
must offer its group a utility below the NR level, such a club will not be
viable relative to any point to the northeast of NR . Second, any mixed
club (profitable or otherwise) offering a utility pair not to the northeast
of NR will not be viable relative to a point northeast of NR since one of
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its utilities will be lower. Finally, consider profitable mixed
alternative clubs to the northeast of NR . Relative to an undominated
point, at least one of the utilities for any such club must be lower since
profitable clubs lie below the CM frontier and the undominated point is by
definition not dominated by any point on the frontier. This means that
such clubs are not viable relative to an undominated point, establishing
that any such point is an equilibrium.
Note that, for simplicity, Proposition 7 does not cover the case
where the CM frontier intersects the H frontier at NR. In this case, it is
easy to see that the CM and H configurations corresponding to NR are both
equilibria. The second part of Proposition 7 is illustrated in Figure 1,
where the CM frontier is shown passing to the northeast of NR. The Pareto-
undominated CM points in this range, which comprise the set of equilibria,
are contained in the segment JM of the frontier.
This analysis shows that when CM configurations exist that are
Pareto-superior to the status-quo point NR, decentralized behavior drives
the economy to one of these configurations. Since it is easily seen that
the transfer T received by the b's is positive in any such equilibrium, the
outcome is identical to that in a standard altruism model, where one group
voluntarily relinquishes income to help the other. 2Z
If CM is always preferred to PM, then equilibrium in the model is
efficient in that no alternative club configuration is Pareto-superior to
any equilibrium configuration (this is clear from Figure 1). However, if
PM is sometimes superior to CM, then the general utility frontier will
sometimes lie above the CM frontier. In this case, both the mixed- and
homogeneous-club equilibria of the model may be inefficient (the general
frontier could pass above either type of equilibrium point). This
27
potential inefficiency is a consequence of the inability of competitive
developers to make interclub transfers.
A difficulty with the conclusions of this analysis is that they
depend critically on the presence of the club composition constraint, which
might be viewed as an unrealistic requirement in a decentralized economy.
Without this constraint, o becomes a choice variable of the developer and
equilibrium may fail to exist. To see this, note that the entry fee P now
explicitly includes o as a argument, with profit maximization requiring nP CT
= 0. This condition reduces to
(l-o) a UKaf ' (o)v/U„ - T = 0. • (21)
Unless (21) holds at o = 9, the previous mixed-club equilibria lose their
equilibrium status since developers can find profitable and viable clubs
with o's different from 0. Since such clubs do not accommodate the
population, no equilibrium exists under the circumstances that previously
led to mixed-club equilibria. In the alternate situation where the CM
frontier passes below NR, equilibrium may or may not exist depending on
whether the u value in a mixed club satisfying (21) and offering v = vNR
exceeds uNR . If this is not the case, then the H configuration
corresponding to NR is the equilibrium. Otherwise, no equilibrium exists.
It is interesting to note that in the absence of the club composition
constraint, equilibrium (when it exists) involves no income redistribution.
This brings to mind the frequently-enunciated concern that local income
redistribution (which is the only kind possible in the model) cannot be
implemented because of the phenomenon of poor chasing rich. While
implementation fails in the present model, the reason is somewhat
different. The problem is not a result of consumer mobility compromising
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the redistribution process but is rather a consequence of developers'
attempts to mix the groups in a manner that is not feasible in order to
best exploit consumer altruism. 23
As a final point, it is interesting to ask how the economy would be
organized if the a-types could specify the club configuration. Under such
an arrangement, the goal of the a's would be to maximize their own utility
subject to the constraint that the b's are willing to participate in the
chosen configuration. Formally, this problem amounts to finding the point
on the general utility frontier that maximizes u subject to the requirement
that v exceeds or equals vNR . Unless this latter constraint is satisfied,
the b's will decline to participate in the chosen configuration, retreating
instead to homogeneous clubs based on the original distribution of income.
A difficulty with this choice process, however, is that cannot be viewed as
decentralized
.
4. Conclusion
Local redistribution is practiced in the U.S. on a variety of
different levels. For example, unequal sharing of the costs of running
school districts and providing other public services leads to extensive
implicit redistribution among households at the community level. Moreover,
the fact that state contributions to federal welfare programs are
substantial and not at all uniform shows that the welfare system involves
an important element of local redistribution. What can be said about such
policies on the basis of the discussion in this paper? The main practical
lesson of the paper is that while local redistribution may be consistent
with efficiency in the presence of spatially-limited altruism, the pursuit
of such policies could involve a substantial welfare cost. Since there is
no reason to think that real world economy mimics the developer model in
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avoiding undesirable equilibria, the economy could conceivably benefit from
homogenization of communities and reassignment of the redistributive
function to higher levels of government. While such a conclusion follows
from the model, it cannot be taken too seriously as a policy prescription.
The main reason is that complementarities in production (as in Berglas
(1976a)) are probably important enough in the real world to invalidate any
call for community homogenization based on public-sector considerations.
In spite of this, awareness of the potential welfare loss from pursuit of
local redistribution can only be beneficial in the analysis of policy
questions related to fiscal federalism.
CM
FIGURE 1
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Footnotes
Professor of Economics and Ph.D. candidate in Economics respectively.
We are indebted to Lanny Arvan for extremely helpful comments on an
earlier version of this paper.
*Brown and Oates (1987) provide a different type of equilibrium analysis
in a model essentially the same as Pauly's.
2Brueckner (1988) used a similar approach to analyse local redistribution
in the absence of .altruism.
3See Berglas and Pines (1981) and Berglas (1984).
^Recall that a previous assumption on C guarantees an interior solution
to (5).
°In a mixed-club problem without altruism, Brueckner (1988) shows that x"
= must hold in the upper range of possible v values, with x b =
holding in the lower range of v values. The present problem exhibits a
similar outcome, with nonnegativity constraints on x" binding for large
values of v. It is also possible that xb may be zero at the CM
solution, although the presence of altruism precludes any definite
statement. While the Samuelson condition (8) is altered when
nonnegativity constraints are binding, this has no effect on any of the
results derived below.
s It should be noted that in contrast to Pauly's characterization of
Pareto-ef f iciency , the welfare of both the rich and the poor is taken
into account in the above discussion (Pauly's Pareto-optimum was defined
relative to the nonpoor members of the club).
T This can be seen by comparing the resource constraint resulting from
complete expropriation of the a's ((2) with x" = z n = 0) to the mixed-
club constraint with xa = (the maximum value of v is found by
maximizing type-b utility subject to this constraint). The latter
constraint is more restrictive, implying that the maximal v is higher
under H than under CM.
B It should be noted that when (10) holds at the H solution, the
nonnegativity constraints on the x 1 cannot be binding at the same v in
the CM problem (this follows because the solutions are identical and the
H solution is interior).
°The derivative is equal to nS
'
( 1-0)C„„/D. where D = -C„„[ (0( 1-9) + 8)nS"
- C«] - (C^ - C x /n) 2 . C„n /D must be positive for the second-order
condition to be satisfied.
1QNote that the utility differential could be positive for all < n < 1,
in which case Ui(v) = 1.
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"Note that the curves in Figure 1 reflect the difference discussed above
in the set of feasible v's under H and CM.
i2The integer problem is again ignored.
13 It should be noted that since homogeneous clubs disappear from the choice
problem when 0=6, the n ± , z 1 , and x ±h variables in Proposition 5 are
in fact undetermined. This problem is handled by defining shadow values
of these variables equal to their limits as o approaches 9. it is easy
to see that the limiting values are those that minimize the per capita
cost of providing the CM utilities in homogeneous clubs (were they to
exist). It is interesting to note that the disappearance of the
homogeneous-club variables from the resource constraint (13) results in
zero values for the multipliers of (11) and (12) when o = 9.
14To see this, consider the case where o > 9. Letting D denote the cost of
displacing one a-type, total displacement cost equals D times the number
of a's outside mixed clubs, which is (1-9)N - 9N(l-o)/o. To find the
displacement cost per a-type remaining in mixed clubs, this must be
divided by 9N(l-o)/o, which yields D(o-9)/9( l-o) . The derivative of
this expression with respect to o (with D held fixed) evaluated at o = 9
is the LHS of (14). A similar argument applies to (15).
ls If the residents of a mixed club were relocated to homogeneous clubs,
they would consume resources equal to (l-o)n(x ,ah + C"Vn~) + on(x faH +
Cb/nb ) . For this to be greater than mixed club consumption (l-o)nx™ +
onxb + C on a per capita basis, (16) must be positive.
ieNote that the problem encountered earlier appears here as well in that
the x 1
,
z, and n variables are undetermined when Q = 0. Once again,
these variables at Q = are set equal to their limiting values as Q
approaches zero. These limiting values minimize the cost of providing
the H utilities in a mixed club (were one to exist).
iVThis follows because, for any o, the derivative expression (16) is a
decreasing function of when Q > 1 , which means that the expression can
be made negative for any o by choosing fl to be sufficiently large.
18Note that It is assumed that developers can identify people by type.
lsNote that T is in fact unrestricted in sign.
aoT« is proportional to U./U,, - V x /Vx .
2
1
It should be noted that this discussion (as well as that below) relies on
the absence of generalized altruism in that the type-a utility level in
an alternative club does not depend on the prevailing type-b utility in
the original club configuration. With generalized altruism, by
contrast, the k value in a alternative mixed club would depend on the
club's own v value as well as the v level in the original configuration.
With type-b utilities nonuniform, the profitability of such a club could
not be evaluated by referring to the CM frontier, which presumes
uniformity. It is easy to see, however, that since the vaweiy part of
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the k argument disappears, the CM and H frontiers are appropriate for
evaluating alternative clubs in the absence of generalized altruism.
!i2 T is positive because the b's reach a higher utility than in a homogenous
club in spite of the efficiency loss of joint public consumption. As a
result, x b + C/n must exceed consumption in a homogeneous club, which
equals I b . But since x b = I b - P + T, it follows that T > 0.
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